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Selling a Resume and Buying a Job: Stratification of Gender and
Occupation by States and Brokers in International Migration from Indonesia
Abstract
This study examines why and how state and commercial actors construct gender, 
occupation, and nationality hierarchies in guest worker programs by comparing the migratory 
procedures for female domestic workers and male industrial operators from Indonesia. Based on 
19 months of multi-sited ethnography and 86 interviews in Indonesia, Taiwan, and Singapore, I 
introduce the notion of multilateralism to theorize the stratification of global migration 
processes. In multilateral labor markets, governments, brokers, employers, and migrants in 
multiple destination and origin countries are contending for labor and employment. The 
homecare market is governed under the rubric of “selling a resume,” whereby Indonesian 
regulators and suppliers pass on recruitment costs to employers, in a context where migrant 
domestics possess myriad destination options due to their reputation fostered by a government-
organized credentialing program. By contrast, Indonesian factory workers expend upfront 
payment to “buy a job” from destination brokers amid rivalry with migrants of other 
nationalities. The Indonesian state’s inattention to elevating industrial migrants’ standing through 
skill formation has compelled private recruiters to vie for jobs by extracting brokerage fees and 
developing a patchwork of selection mechanisms. This article finds that social actors’ capacity to 
negotiate the terms of labor exchange is contingent on their structural locations within a global 
hierarchy of competing nation-states.
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Men buy a job, as employers don’t need us. Women don’t pay for a job, as employers need them.
--Haryanto, 21
Husbands should be our providers, but why are we the ones providing for them?
--Atun, 43
To land an entry-level factory position in Taiwan, Haryanto made a US$2,610 down 
payment to a Taiwanese staffing agency and arranged to settle his debt to a local contractor 
through nine months of salary deductions. And, though Atun had preferred her husband to work 
abroad, he pressured her to serve as a caregiver on her third, employer-subsidized contract in 
Taiwan. While Indonesian guest workers, like Haryanto and Atun, share analogous 
demographics, a bifurcated international migratory system has emerged along gender and 
occupational lines. Presently, migrant domestic workers (MDWs) destined for Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, and Singapore do not pay brokerage fees, are lent a $210 incentive allowance, and pay 
off placement loans in six to nine monthly installments. By contrast, in addition to a similar debt-
repayment scheme, migrant factory workers (MFWs) disburse between $2,000 and $2,900 in 
commissions to Taiwanese brokers, an equivalent of at least two years of blue-collar wages in 
source communities. Whereas the Indonesian government bans commissions to foreign 
headhunters, it regulates placement loans earmarked for Indonesian recruiters’ operational 
expenditures, including fees for services, passport, visa, airfare, training, and insurance. 
In partnership with overseas employment agencies, Indonesian suppliers characterize 
Asia’s gendered mobility through the emic terms, “selling a resume” (jual biodata) and “buying 
a job” (beli job). The modus operandi of homecare transactions is selling a resume, whereby 
Indonesian brokers pass on recruitment expenses to employers, who entice MDWs away from 
other destinations by advancing capital to support their cross-border passage. Conversely, 
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Indonesian MFWs expend capital to purchase jobs from destination agents amid rivalry with 
laborers from other developing nations. Whereas employer sponsorship has deepened migrant 
women’s incorporation into the transnational care economy, the enormous financial barriers 
erected by foreign brokers have excluded low-income men and circumscribed migrant men’s 
livelihoods.
As the world’s largest provider of female MDWs and a burgeoning sender of 
predominantly male MFWs, Indonesia epitomizes how globalization has exacerbated inequality 
among labor migrants worldwide. Extant research attributes migrants’ divergent employment 
opportunities to demographic transition in the Global North (Lan 2006; Parreñas 2001) and 
excess labor in the South (Abella 2004; Platt et al. 2017). However, most studies examine 
women or men in isolation (for exceptions, Lindquist 2010; Sobieszczyk 2000), invoking 
abstract economistic factors that overlook the stratification of migratory processes along gender, 
class, ethnicity, and other axes of difference. 
Through a systematic comparison of Indonesia’s homecare and industrial migration 
streams, this study interrogates why and how states and brokers construct gender, occupation, 
and nationality hierarchies to mediate migrants’ insertion into the global labor market. While 
analysts conventionally examine a single migrant-receiving or -sending country, or deploy a 
binational standpoint, this study is among the first to propose a multilateral perspective, arguing 
that states and brokers are entangled in an occupationally segmented migratory order straddling 
multiple destination and origin countries. Amid interstate rivalry for social reproductive labor, 
Indonesian regulators and recruiters have carved out a niche by professionalizing domestic 
service, allowing them to externalize migrants’ maintenance costs to host societies. In contrast to 
its strategic intervention in homecare, the Indonesian government’s inattention to elevating 
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MFWs’ status in the origin hierarchy through a comprehensive training program has compelled 
suppliers to extract brokerage fees and formulate a patchwork of selection procedures to break 
into the factory market. I conceive of origin hierarchy as a social stratification system in which 
migrants are ranked in accordance with their aggregate qualifications, such as education, skills, 
international experience, and other characteristics associated with national origins. 
Based on nineteen months of multi-sited ethnography and 86 in-depth interviews in 
Indonesia, Taiwan, and Singapore, this study contends that, although host countries reinforce 
guest workers’ precarity through the denial of political rights (Anderson and Franck 2019), their 
leverage is contingent on the strategic actions of other players within a broader field of 
competing nations. In this supranational system, the demand for, and supply of, migrant labor are 
mutually constitutive, structured by state and commercial actors across several receiving and 
sending countries that simultaneously jockey for advantage. By concertedly cultivating their 
citizens’ global standing, origin countries are capable of seizing a market share and wresting 
concessions from more affluent economies in the realm of labor conditions. In this article, I 
explore power differentials between Indonesia and its key trading partners in the homecare and 
factory markets, focusing on how states and brokers organize international labor markets through 
external negotiations with their counterparts in other polities, as well as internal regulatory and 
brokerage practices.
THE STATE AND MIGRATION INDUSTRY
The migration industry is an ensemble of profit-oriented intermediaries, or brokers, that 
match mobile labor with place-bound capital by arranging paperwork, transportation, 
employment, and other services facilitative of transborder mobility (Gammeltoft-Hansen and 
Sørensen 2013; Hernandez-Leon 2005; Lindquist, Xiang, and Yeoh 2012). The industry is 
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rendered possible, even indispensable, by the global diffusion of guest worker programs, 
whereby governments maximize developmental benefits by outsourcing labor management to 
private entities (Anderson and Franck 2019; Tseng and Wang 2013). Under neoliberal 
rationality, destination states regulate immigration by authorizing brokers to confine guest 
workers to occupations shunned by citizens and repatriate them at contractual termination 
(Cranston, Schapendonk, and Spaan 2018). Devolution of migration governance ensures the 
renewal of a transient, malleable manpower supply in sectors experiencing labor shortages 
(McCollum and Findlay 2018). Likewise, origin states nurture the migration industry to realize 
their own objectives, from lowering administrative expenses and alleviating population 
pressures, to harnessing remittances for development (Iskander 2010). 
For industry actors, debt bondage is a pivotal profit-making strategy. It is beneficial for 
recruitment as it obviates the need for cash-strapped individuals to mobilize funds for financing 
migration, and for risk management as loans are recaptured through salary installments (Platt et 
al. 2017). Brokers may also appropriate direct payment from employers or workers, a method 
that, albeit lucrative, raises financial stakes for the latter two parties (Sobieszczyk 2000). 
However, analysts have found that employers and grooms in countries from Lebanon, the United 
Arab Emirates, and the United States, to Israel, Taiwan, and Japan sponsor the migration of 
domestics (Fernandez 2013; Kemp and Raijman 2014; Parreñas et al. 2018), brides (Bélanger 
and Wang 2013), and nurses (Guevarra 2009). Conversely, migrant men in agriculture 
(Anderson and Franck 2019), construction (Buckley 2012), and technology (Xiang 2007) 
shoulder a combination of loans and lump-sum fees in comparable destinations where migrant 
women are deployed. Consequently, migrant men are saddled with inordinate debt even before 
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overseas departure, and face financial ruin upon employers’ dismissal (Abella 2004; Xiang 
2007). Why, then, do brokers across the globe devise profit schemes that vary by gender? 
Scholars posit that gendered disparities in mobility arise from a demand for care work 
induced by population aging, and intra-labor rivalry for a paucity of formal employment 
emanating from occupational change (Abella 2004; Lindquist 2010; Sobieszczyk 2000). In 
attributing primacy to these impersonal laws, however, both perspectives obscure the cardinal 
role of states and brokers in maneuvering transnational labor markets for political legitimacy and 
monetary gain (Iskander 2010; Surak 2018). I advance a multilateral approach to theorize how 
interstate contestations fuel the reproduction of a gendered, supranational migratory system.
A MULTILATERAL APPROACH TO GENDERED MIGRATION
Analysts influenced by Bourdieu (1984) postulate that individuals’ ability to elevate their 
social position is derived from the volume and composition of capital—economic, cultural, 
human, and social—at their disposal (Kim 2018; Paul 2017). In this view, the poor may prolong 
their overseas sojourn by amassing sociocultural and financial resources in lower-tier 
destinations, so as to pursue stepwise migration to economies with higher wages and better labor 
safeguards. Migrants embark on incremental trajectories to their ideal destinations, or societies 
high up in what Paul (2017) calls “destination hierarchies,” as the latter implement stringent 
admission criteria in the form of financial requirements, credentials, and work experiences. 
Whereas this scholarship underscores how individuals accumulate capital to realize their 
migration projects, it has not elucidated how such capacities are conditioned by their origin 
hierarchy status. Other researchers emphasize how employers’ racialized stereotypes have 
channeled migrants of myriad ethnicities into distinct occupations: Filipinas and Ukrainians into 
global nursing and custodial care (Guevarra 2009; Solari 2017); Lithuanians and Chinese, fishing 
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and construction (Friberg and Midtbøen 2018; Kemp and Raijman 2014); Mexicans and 
Moroccans, agriculture (Iskander 2010). While this literature underlines how ethnonational 
cleavages are concocted by host states to reinforce social control, I contend they are also molded 
by sending institutions vying to augment emigrants’ employability in a broader migratory order.
The formation of international labor markets of a multilateral character is underwritten by 
the ratification of manifold guest worker agreements permitting governments to reduce their 
dependence on single countries for labor and employment (Garapich 2008; Parreñas et al. 2018; 
Rainwater and Williams 2019). That is, multilateralism allows employers to source labor from 
more than one country, and migrants to work in several destinations. The scope of this system is 
delineated by a nation’s arsenal of bilateral labor accords, with some markets exhibiting more 
geographical breadth than others.1 These markets, I maintain, are further stratified arising from 
gendered migration policies enacted by governments worldwide.
Feminist scholars contend that gender ideologies are endemic to state practices (Enloe 
1983) that unequally condition people’s mobility. Societies in the Global South typically 
construe women’s overseas work as a challenge to male prerogatives over providership and 
female sexuality, with migrant women perceived as in need of paternalistic protection (Gamburd 
2000; Solari 2017). Accordingly, sending states tend to inhibit female mobility by implementing 
“value-driven emigration policies” (Oishi 2005) that involve emigration bans and other exit 
barriers. Concurrently, developed economies expand female workforce participation by 
encouraging working families to contract out reproductive labor—traditionally devalued, unpaid, 
and borne by women—to migrant women in the poorly remunerated, often ununionized informal 
economy (Parreñas 2001). Meanwhile, in the factory market, origin states conventionally 
1 The Philippines and South Korea, for example, have geographically extensive multilateral markets, having enacted 
labor agreements with 17 and 15 destination and origin states, respectively (Oh et al. 2012; Rodriguez 2010).
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stimulate male emigration to buttress the ideal of breadwinning masculinity (Oishi 2005; Xiang 
2007). Under pressure from trade unions to protect formal jobs for male citizens, however, host 
countries enact immigration quotas and universalist labor standards to take wages out of 
competition (Surak 2018). Industrialists’ demand for migrant labor is thus tempered by 
restrictions on labor import. When aggregated on a multilateral scale, these migration regulations 
provide the objective circumstances—wherein supply outpaces demand in industrial 
employment, and vice versa in homecare—that skew the relative leverage of origin and 
destination societies. Nonetheless, the mere presence of favorable conditions in a given market 
does not guarantee the possession of bargaining power, because countries are competing with 
one another for scarce resources. Hence, to determine the balance of power between individual 
countries requires investigating the full constellation of social actors, along with the organization 
of labor demand in relation to supply, in a multi-country field.
I bring together Bourdieusian and gendered migration scholarship to argue that, against 
the backdrop of global migration policies, source countries can proactively incubate “migration-
facilitating capital” (Kim 2018) to inculcate a demand for their emigrant labor. A vital, yet 
understudied, mechanism for strengthening migrants’ place in the origin hierarchy is deploying 
the symbolic legitimacy of official classification (Kim 2018) through public investment in 
education, training, and accreditation (Guevarra 2009; Ortiga 2014; Rodriguez 2010). States and 
brokers may further develop a comparative advantage in labor export by producing a workforce 
with desirable gender expressions: menial labor for blue-collar workers; emotional labor for care 
workers (Guevarra 2009; Lan 2016). This article mobilizes the notions of multilateralism and 
hierarchies to compare how origin and destination forces jockey for position to shape the 
homecare and factory labor markets. 
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INDONESIA-TAIWAN MIGRATION CORRIDOR
Since the inception of Indonesia’s labor migration program in 1981, the New Order 
regime had invited the private sector to fulfill its ambitious development targets, with working-
class women actively inducted into transborder domestic service (Silvey 2004). Nevertheless, the 
migration industry was marred by corruption, as the strongman, President Suharto, prioritized 
political patronage over labor protection. This state-industry collusion enabled Indonesian 
recruiters to amass profit through illicit debt bondage and salary underpayment (Palmer 2016). 
By the end of the authoritarian era, the multilateral market for MDWs had expanded with 
Indonesia’s negotiation of labor agreements with new Asian destinations (Hugo 2012). Sparked 
by Saudi Arabia’s executions of Indonesian housemaids and Malaysia’s mass deportations of 
undocumented Indonesians, the popularly elected Megawati administration restructured the 
migration bureaucracy. Under the Board for the Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers 
(Badan Perlindungan Pekerja Migran Indonesia; BP2MI), established in 2007, the world’s third 
most populous democracy enhanced its administrative capacities by regulating indenture, 
rationalizing pre-departure training, and installing labor attachés—embassy personnel tasked 
with migrant protection (Palmer 2016). While Indonesia has historically deployed irregular 
migrants to Malaysia’s agroindustry, it is more renowned as a sender of live-in care workers. As 
of 2018, caregivers and housekeepers were Indonesia’s top authorized emigrant categories, with 
women comprising 70% of contract labor (BP2MI 2018). Indonesian MDWs boast a significant 
presence across Asia and the Middle East, from Malaysia and Brunei to the United Arab 
Emirates and Kuwait (Killias 2018; Parreñas et al. 2018; Silvey 2004). 
Coming on the heels of rapid industrialization that transformed Taiwan into an economic 
powerhouse, the Taiwanese authorities contained unauthorized migration by formalizing a guest 
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worker scheme in 1992. To prevent the replacement of citizen labor, technocrats designed a 
restrictive immigration regime underpinned by a quota system, wherein a pre-determined volume 
of slots were distributed among employers’ associations (Tsay and Lin 2001). The island also 
signed memoranda of understanding with six countries to diversify labor sources, in what 
became a linchpin of “foreign labor diplomacy” (Lan 2006). Coupled with the state’s pro-
employer stance, immigration quotas granted Taiwan’s migration industry leeway to expropriate 
guest workers, at a time when few Asian countries were importing labor (interview, CY, 2018). 
However, a migrant riot during the construction of the Kaohsiung Metro ignited public demands 
for immigration reform (Tierney 2007). Over the past decade, Taiwan has enshrined policies to 
protect migrants by implementing a 24-hour crisis hotline, shelters, direct hiring, and worksite 
inspections (interview, SY, 2018). In 2019, Taiwan recorded the presence of 718,058 guest 
workers with an especially strong demand for industrial migrants, who captured 61% of the 
migrant pool as compared with 35% for caregivers. In the same year, Indonesians captured the 
lion share of MDWs at 77% (201,647), with Filipinas and Vietnamese trailing behind at 12% and 
11%. Meanwhile, Vietnamese comprised 43% of MFWs, followed by Filipinos, Indonesians, and 
Thais at 28%, 16% (74,764), and 13% (Ministry of Labor, Taiwan 2019). From 2014 to 2019, 
Taiwan had been among the top three destinations for Indonesians (BP2MI 2018).
While Indonesia and Taiwan constitute the focus of this article, I assert that their nexus 
must be situated in Asia’s multilateral labor markets, which are mediated by occupationally 
segmented destination and origin hierarchies. At the top of Indonesians’ destination hierarchy in 
homecare, Hong Kong is widely heralded as a regional trendsetter, with union representation, 
minimum wage, an unpaid day off per week, and fringe benefits for MDWs, including up to two 
weeks of paid vacation leave a year (Paul 2017). MDWs in Hong Kong may work as 
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housekeepers, nannies, and elder caregivers. Taiwan, by contrast, mandates most migrant helpers 
to care for seniors and people with disabilities, and has no regulations on rest days, though they 
are entitled to weekend compensation. A modest wage gap with Hong Kong, along with 
employers’ expectations that MDWs provide 24-hour standby services (Lan 2016), has 
attenuated Taiwan’s destination appeal. Singapore occupies among the lowest echelons of 
Indonesians’ destination preferences, as its base salary for MDWs falls below East Asian 
standards (Paul 2017). In 2018, Hong Kong and Singapore were Indonesians’ third and fourth 
leading destinations (BP2MI 2018). From employers’ standpoint, Filipinas and Indonesians rank 
higher than Vietnamese and Burmese in the homecare origin hierarchy. Whereas some families 
prefer Filipinas for their college pedigree, cosmopolitanism, and English proficiency, those with 
elders value Indonesians’ malleability, deference, and host language skills (Constable 2007; Lan 
2016). 
Japan and South Korea are Indonesians’ preeminent destinations for industrial 
employment due to high salaries and robust labor standards. However, despite commanding 
lower wages, Taiwan has attracted steady inflows of migrant labor, as its entry barriers, 
placement volume, and employment tenure are comparatively liberal. Whereas South Korea and 
Japan mandate a high school diploma and destination language certification as entry criteria, 
Taiwan has no formal educational or language requirements, sets few limits on the intake of 
guest workers, and permits contractual extension for 12 years (Surak 2018). In 2018, South 
Korea and Japan were the seventh and sixteenth largest destinations for Indonesians, with a 
placement volume of 6,905 and 458 (BP2MI 2018)—a combined total comprising only a tenth of 
Taiwan’s. From industrialists’ perspective, Indonesia ranks low in the origin hierarchy. The 
archipelago missed Asia’s peak demand for MFWs, entering it at a moment when other labor 
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exporters had cemented their reputation (Hugo 2012; Rainwater and Williams 2019). In Taiwan, 
Thais and Filipinos are typecast as semi-skilled, and Vietnamese and Indonesians as unskilled, 
operators. In 1990, Thailand struck a deal with Taiwan to provide the island’s first cohort of 
guest workers (Rainwater and Williams 2019). By the 2000s, the kingdom had become Taiwan’s 
leading labor supplier in manufacturing and construction (Tsay and Lin 2001). Though a 
latecomer to the factory market, the Philippine state’s prominent role in identifying overseas 
employment opportunities and promoting higher education and training has allowed Filipinos to 
gain a foothold in Taiwan’s high-tech industry (Rodriguez 2010; Sills and Chowthi 2008).
METHODS
This article draws on 19 months of multi-sited ethnography and interviews with 86 
brokers, credentialing accessors, state officials, nongovernmental organizations, and migrants in 
Indonesia, Taiwan, and Singapore (Table 1). In 2014, I conducted one month of research 
shadowing Indonesian lathe operators on a metal factory’s shop floor in Changhua,Taiwan. 
Subsequently, I began my fieldwork in Indonesia by following a MFW I had met at a Taipei-
based NGO to his home village in Ponorogo, the archipelago’s sixth largest source regency 
(BP2MI 2018). Between 2014 and 2017, I conducted participant observation in three Overseas 
Training Centers (Balai Latihan Kerja Luar Negri; BLKLN) for MDWs in Ponorogo, and one in 
Jakarta. The four licensed firms annually dispatched 300 to 1,000 MDWs to Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, and Singapore. A joint venture with foreign investors, the Jakarta agency deployed an 
additional 1,000 industrial operators to Taiwan each year. This company’s recruitment of MDWs 
and MFWs offers a unique prism for comparing the two migration streams. My position as a 
male, middle-class, young American researcher of Taiwanese descent facilitated my entry into 
the four companies. Leveraging my proficiency in Mandarin, Taiwanese, and Indonesian, I 
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served as an unpaid language assistant for an average of four months in each agency, during 
which I translated resumes, observed job training, and taught destination languages. My 
immersion into company life provides rare insight into how brokers manage labor, observe the 
migration policies of several countries, and engage in business dealings with foreign clientele.
To extend my ethnography to Indonesia’s commercial and regulatory ecosystem, I 
conducted semi-structured interviews, averaging one to two hours, with the management of 22 
company headquarters and branch offices in Jakarta, Surabaya, Ponorogo, and Manado. Through 
referral and snowballing, I selected firms with a placement volume of over 200 migrants per 
year. While the majority specialized in the Asia-Pacific region, four were pioneers in the Middle 
Eastern market. To investigate the sending state’s industry oversight, I interviewed fourteen 
senior and midranking officials in labor bureaus at the national, provincial, and regency level: 
nine at BP2MI; two at the Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration; one at East Java 
province’s manpower bureau; two at the Ponorogo and North Minahasa regencies’ manpower 
bureaus. Part of a broader sample of 52 aspiring and returned migrants and their spouses, I used a 
subset of 10 interviews with MDWs and MFWs to underscore how the migratory system 
unevenly structures migrants’ lives. 
Conversations with visiting foreign headhunters during ethnographic observation led me 
to consider how destination societies manage guest workers. Between 2017 and 2018, I 
interviewed a Singaporean staffing agent and Taiwanese brokers, bureaucrats, and NGOs. My 
Taiwanese sample includes the management of seven placement agencies that sourced MDWs 
and MFWs from the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and Indonesia. Though one was family-run, 
the remainder were certified “Grade A,” the highest distinction awarded to Taiwanese firms. To 
understand the evolution of Taiwan’s guest worker program, I interviewed the leaders of two 
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non-profit organizations and four senior and midranking bureaucrats at the Taiwanese Ministry 
of Labor and New Taipei and Kaohsiung’s municipal labor bureaus. Triangulating ethnographic 
and interview data involving diverse stakeholders in the three countries enabled me to verify 
informants’ accounts. I used pseudonyms to protect my interlocutors’ confidentiality.
My assistants and I transcribed interviews in Indonesian and Chinese separately, though I 
translated all of them on my own. I coded transcripts and field notes using the qualitative data 
analysis software, NVivo. Through a combination of theory-driven and inductive coding 
(Deterding and Waters 2018), I focused on recurring themes in developing my coding schemes, 
such as labor market segmentation, migrant racialization, labor protection, and job training.
                                                  (Table 1 about here)
HOMECARE MARKET 
Organization of Supply
By collaborating with recruiters to implement pre-departure training, Indonesian 
regulators have solidified MDWs’ status in the homecare origin hierarchy, permitting them to 
externalize the costs of labor maintenance to host societies via pay raises and resume sales.
Credentialing
Indonesia’s stature as one of the world’s pioneering female labor exporters has cultivated 
generations of seasoned MDWs who are valorized in the transborder care economy. Overtime, as 
Indonesian brokers secured the loyalty of foreign customers, they utilized their international 
knowhow to develop new markets. Sophia, a recruiter of European extraction who dispatched 
Indonesia’s first cohort of housemaids to Syria, describes how Indonesia’s expertise in labor 
provision has produced self-reinforcing tendencies: “Saudi was the first to begin. Then, Brunei 
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asked for [Indonesians], and the market began to boom there. After that, [demand in] Asia took 
off. Around the 90’s, Singapore began, with Malaysia following suit.” Indonesian brokers’ foray 
into the Middle East, then, inaugurated a process of migrant succession, as they capitalized on 
their international experience to meet job vacancies in Asia that were being increasingly 
relinquished by Filipinas, who had begun to pursue onward migration to the West (Paul 2017). 
In particular, Indonesia’s distinguished status in the origin hierarchy is enhanced by the 
specialized training women receive prior to arrival in employers’ homes. In compliance with 
Indonesian state regulations, prospective MDWs for Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore 
undertake 400 to 600 hours of accreditation at Overseas Training Centers, usually managed by 
recruitment agencies with separate licensing. At the conclusion of training, candidates are 
required to pass the Professional Competence Examination (Uji Kompetensi Profesi) overseen by 
government-supervised Credentialing Institutes (Lembaga Sertifikasi Profesi; LSP). This 
national standard is intended to professionalize rural women, the backbone of Indonesia’s 
emigrant population, to ensure their care services meet foreign families’ needs. I argue that this 
state-led skill formation has burnished Indonesia’s prestige in homecare by producing a 
disciplined, multilingual workforce.  
                                                  (Figure 1 about here)
A cornerstone of credentialing is mental adaptation. During more than two months of 
resocialization, trainers acclimate would-be MDWs to status inequality in the employment 
relationship, along with work obligations, cultural norms, and house rules commonly observed 
overseas (Chang 2018). The Indonesian state further tailors migrant skillsets to host societies’ 
occupational requirements. Whereas MDWs bound for Taiwan undertake 22 units of assessment 
focused on Mandarin language acquisition and nursing skills—such as wheelchair usage, sponge 
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bath, and massaging techniques—those for Hong Kong and Singapore, who are primarily 
admitted as nannies and housekeepers, are expected to master 15 units composed of childcare, 
housework, and competency in Cantonese and English, respectively. Indonesian trainers place an 
especially strong emphasis on candidates’ comprehension of employer commands in the 
languages of reception. Common interview questions concerning occupational protocol 
encompass what times of the day to deliver medication, how to explain patients’ illnesses to 
doctors, how to care for bedridden elders in hospitals, and how to handle telephone calls on 
elders’ behalf. 
A language test I observed reveals the state’s effort at advancing MDWs’ competencies 
vital for Indonesia’s conquest of the homecare market. Sri, an examiner, tests a Singapore-bound 
trainee one day: “Translate [the English word] command. What does command mean?” The 
candidate gazes down at the floor but utters nothing. Leaving the woman standing while awaiting 
a response, Sri summons a returnee to Taiwan, posing in a shrill tone, “If you worked in Taiwan 
and your child was sick, would you return to Indonesia?” The trainee responds in Mandarin 
effortlessly: “No, I wouldn’t. When I used to work in Taiwan, my father passed away, but I 
didn’t return home.” Seemingly satisfied, Sri wears a smile and excuses the veteran migrant 
without further questioning. 
This scenario illuminates how sending institutions fashion a pliable labor force by 
coaching MDWs to steadfastly abide by professional duties, even in the face of family 
emergencies. Indeed, from the state’s perspective, language evaluations operate in tandem with 
mental preparedness to harmonize labor relations. Susanto, head of a credentialing institute 
authorized to assess migrant credentials, notes that language testing assists the state in averting 
employment disputes through the alignment of migrants and employers’ interests: “In the past, 
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there were many problems, since Indonesians didn’t understand destination languages. When 
told to cook corn, the maid cooked eggs instead. Or, when the employer had a stroke, she didn’t 
help them. Hence, the government has prioritized language acquisition to reduce 
misunderstandings on the part of workers.”
Beyond participating in the accreditation program, brokers design their own methods for 
instilling labor discipline. At an agency run by Koan, a Chinese-Indonesian broker, recruits are 
barred from leaving company premises until overseas departure, undertaking 13 hours of daily 
training that include two housekeeping shifts, eight hours of coursework, and two hours of 
obedience training at night. Commenting on his team’s survey of the nation’s recruitment 
agencies, Fajar, an Indonesian Manpower Ministry official, underlines how the managers they 
had interviewed rationalized labor control: “If a trainee wasn’t mentally prepared to overcome 
[worksite problems], she wouldn’t be able to adapt well and wouldn’t be motivated to work.” 
State-industry ties in the promotion of MDWs’ “export-value” (Guevarra 2009) have 
enabled Indonesians to make inroads in the global labor market, esteemed for their skills, 
diligence, and adaptability. Late exporters, in turn, have had to contend with Indonesia’s vaunted 
reputation. The perception that Indonesians excel in homecare is reflected in 57% of my 
Taiwanese and Singaporean respondents, most of whom ascribe the high demand for Indonesian 
MDWs to the latter’s credentialing program, which is regarded as more holistic than the training 
offered by other sending countries. For instance, Lin, manager of a placement agency in Taipei, 
stresses how credentialing has promoted Indonesian MDWs’ competitiveness in several 
destinations:
Indonesians can go to Hong Kong or Saudi Arabia. They have a plethora of destination 
options. So, for them, Taiwan probably isn’t their top choice. But we still prefer 
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Indonesians. We think that Indonesia does a more thorough job of training care workers, 
because they have a longer duration of training compared to Vietnam.
Similarly, Supri, an Indonesian employee of a Hong Kong-based firm, avers that robust 
training has enabled Indonesia to outcompete other suppliers:
Indonesians are still dominant in Hong Kong … But Hong Kong agents are looking for 
workers from other countries since Indonesian regulations are too time-consuming: 
Indonesians have to undertake 60 days of training before being allowed to fly out. Hong 
Kongers are now sourcing labor from Myanmar and Vietnam, but those countries have 
low human capital. Their [Cantonese] and other skills also don’t match Indonesians’. 
Beyond nurturing MDWs’ human and cultural capital, rigorous professionalization has 
contributed to employers’ recognition of Indonesians as a compliant workforce. Though 
acknowledging Myanmar’s position as an emerging homecare provider, Juanda, a Singaporean 
broker with two decades of experience, conveys—in a mixture of Indonesian and Singaporean 
English—cross-national variations in labor traits that redound to Indonesians’ benefit, racializing 
women of competing nationalities: 
Indonesians are easier to manage. They’re more obedient. Filipinas are smarter, but 
they’re more outspoken. The Burmese aren’t educated but they’re stubborn and 
hardheaded (keras kepala). If an employer gets angry and yells, “You stupid, you stupid!” 
the Burmese would retort, “Ma’am, you stupid!’ I think this is due to their culture: 
Myanmar is so poor that hiring maids hasn’t become a trend there. 
Here, Juanda underscores Indonesians’ nonconfrontational demeanor—a quality instilled during 
credentialing—as an asset for Singaporean families, juxtaposing it to Burmese’s perceived 
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unprofessionalism. While Juanda’s view ostensibly mirrors Lan’s (2016) observation that 
destination brokers manipulate migrants’ ethnic characteristics to construct employer demand, I 
submit that regulators and brokers in source countries play an equally significant role in 
producing migrants that fulfill these racialized stereotypes. As the Indonesian, Singaporean, and 
Taiwanese brokers cited above suggest, while the growing demand for reproductive labor in 
wealthy economies may work to the advantage of developing countries, it is the concrete 
strategies adopted by sending institutions to improve their nationals’ standing that are decisive 
for reaping a market share and boosting their overall leverage.
Interstate Negotiations and Industry Regulation
 In conjunction with privately organized labor management, the credentialing program 
has aided Indonesia in forging a monopsony in homecare, emboldening President Joko Widodo 
(“Jokowi”) to advocate an agenda of emigrant wellbeing by pressing for pay raises. My 
interview in 2016 with Wahyu, a former Indonesian labor attaché to Taiwan, elucidates how the 
Jokowi administration’s strategy of labor protection has resulted in mounting hiring costs for 
employers. For nearly two decades since Taiwan opened its borders to Southeast Asians, the base 
salary for MDWs had stagnated at NT$15,740 ($525), nearly 20% below the minimum wage. In 
a feat covered in the Taiwanese press (Central News Agency 2017), Wahyu describes how 
Indonesian emissaries, with the endorsement of diplomats from other sending countries, 
accomplished an 8% salary hike for all MDWs in 2015: 
We negotiated for domestic workers’ salary to be raised. This is significant, as the 
domestic sector isn’t regulated. Our Taiwanese counterpart believes that wage levels 
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should be determined by employers and workers, not the government. In the end, not only 
Indonesians, but all foreign [domestic] workers, including Filipinas, enjoy this wage hike.
Wahyu stresses that Indonesia’s successful negotiation was rooted in its citizens’ dominance in 
the Taiwanese homecare market. Indonesia has also exploited its market position to pursue a 
parallel bargaining strategy with Hong Kong and Singapore, both of which have granted salary 
increases for Indonesian MDWs (Anya 2019; Yi 2015). 
In addition to promoting salary growth, the Indonesian state has lessened migrants’ 
financial burdens by reducing placement loans to purge illegal middlemen, or sponsors 
(Lindquist 2010), who have historically appropriated migrants’ earnings for assisting Indonesian 
companies with scouring for labor. In fact, when MDWs first entered the Taiwanese market, they 
paid a triple commission to sponsors and to Indonesian and foreign agencies, as noted by 
Bambang, a manager in Jakarta: “Around 2005, domestics had to pay Indonesian brokers around 
[$210], but we also had to pay Taiwanese agents. [The latter] enjoyed more profits then as the 
demand for Indonesians was limited.” 
Under the state’s growing oversight, however, Indonesian brokers are barred from 
charging recruitment fees to migrants, prompting them to pass on sponsor commissions to 
employers through the sale of resumes. Liang, manager of a Taiwanese agency with an 
Indonesian subsidiary, explains how the sending state’s regulatory measures have constrained 
employers’ leverage, forcing them to finance the enlistment of Indonesian MDWs by paying for 
their resumes: “Under Indonesian laws, Indonesian agents are no longer able to net a profit to 
cover sponsor fees. So now the buyer’s side has to purchase resumes.” Amid a spike in demand 
for Indonesian labor, the origin state’s curtailment of placement loans has tilted the balance of 
power from Taiwanese to Indonesian brokers. Chu, leader of a Taiwanese family firm, now 
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coaxes employers to accept the new rules of exchange: “You gotta let employers know that it’s 
the age of User Pays. If you instill this belief in them, then they’ll learn to accept it, and 
recognize that they’re responsible for buying a resume.” The Indonesian state’s intervention has 
likewise altered the norms by which Singaporean agents operate, who now require employers, 
rather than migrants, to cover recruitment costs, as described by Juanda: “In the past, we could 
lower employers’ service fees, as we’d take a cut from maids through wage deductions. These 
days, due to Indonesian regulations, we’re being pressured to reduce the maid’s loan. So, service 
fees gotta go up.” Through public-private partnership in skill training, then, Indonesia has 
constructed a comparative advantage in homecare, thereby bolstering its authority to negotiate 
more favorable terms of exchange on behalf of MDWs.
Organization of Demand
Two factors hinder Taiwan’s capacity to organize the homecare market in its favor. First, 
employers across Asia are scrambling for a finite migrant pool controlled by Indonesia. Second, 
Taiwan’s policy instruments have not adequately addressed the demands of an aging population. 
Competing Destination States and Resume Fees
A crucial deterrent for Indonesian MDWs is Taiwan’s moderate position in their 
destination hierarchy. Evi, CEO of an agency supplying housemaids to Malaysia, extols Hong 
Kong’s virtues as a prime destination: “It’s only quality maids who end up in Hong Kong. That’s 
because they get to enjoy four days off per month, during which they can take enrichment 
classes. But this isn’t possible in Taiwan, where they have to care for grannies.” Slamet, head of 
a pioneering training center in Jakarta for Taiwan-bound domestics, expresses a similar view: 
“For workers in Hong Kong, [having days off] gives them an opportunity to explore unrestrained 
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freedoms (pergaulan bebas). In Taiwan, there’s little entertainment, but in Hong Kong there’s 
plenty of fun.” 
Taiwan’s waning allure has stoked fears for the island’s ability to replenish its female 
migrant supply. Huang, a labor official in Kaohsiung, highlights how Taiwan’s relationship with 
Indonesia has reversed over the course of a decade. Emphasizing that Taiwan once enacted a 
two-year entry ban on Indonesian MDWs in 2003, Huang evinces the country’s deteriorating 
leverage today: “It’s no longer a buyer’s market. If Indonesian caregivers chose not to come to 
Taiwan, more than 20 million households would suddenly face a shortage of caregivers.” At the 
lower end of the destination ladder, Singaporeans confront additional hurdles, as Hong Kong and 
Taiwan’s better work conditions are luring Indonesians away from the city-state. Juanda 
underscores how Singaporeans’ nitpickiness brews migrant discontent: “In Singapore maids have 
to multitask, and they even have to clean the walls! Singapore is a stressful country. They want 
maids to work fast, but the home still has to be clean. This makes the two parties clash.”  
This rising competition for Indonesian MDWs has compelled employers in Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, and Singapore to bid for their resumes. Reflecting the archipelago’s market leadership, 
the practice of resume-buying applies exclusively to Indonesian labor. Kao, CEO of a Kaohsiung 
agency, explains why Taiwanese employers are willing to pay a premium for Indonesian 
caregivers, even though it is less costly to hire other nationalities: “We have a huge demand for 
Indonesian maids, as they’re more obedient and more willing to comply with employers’ needs. 
Thus, though Indonesians cost more, employers are willing to pay more because they feel it’s 
worth it.” The cost of an Indonesian resume in Taiwan hovers between $300 and $700, 
depending on employers’ recruitment criteria, such as international experience, language skills, 
education, age, height, weight, and other traits. Resumes for candidates with overseas work 
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histories generally fetch higher fees because employers value their intercultural adaptation. Chu 
denotes the average price range of Indonesian resumes in Taiwan: “Resume prices are constantly 
ratcheting up. Caregivers who’ve been to Taiwan can muster around [$500] as they’re the cream 
of the crop. Those who haven’t been to Taiwan cost around [$258]. If they’ve been to Singapore, 
the Middle East, or Hong Kong, their resumes can fetch up to [$386].”
Employers encounter other repercussions amid interstate rivalry. Chen, a Philippine and 
Indonesian labor specialist in Kaohsiung, describes prolonged wait times for employers: “Too 
many employers are trying to grab ahold of Indonesian caregivers! Our agency currently has 40 
to 50 employers lined up looking for them.” Bosses in Indonesia’s leading export markets are 
further pressed to remunerate sponsors with spiraling commissions. In an idiom of neoclassical 
economics, Lau, a Taiwanese-educated Indonesian broker, underscores how labor scarcities have 
amplified the costs of labor procurement: “When a commodity is scarce, in the end we’ll need to 
buy people. Since many women have gone overseas, there’re limited stocks available. [We’d tell 
sponsors], ‘I’ll hand you cash [from employers] for you to look for women.’” 
That employers across Asia are racing to enlist Indonesian MDWs has profoundly 
impacted household decision-making, with Indonesian families tending to send women to work 
abroad. For example, employer sponsorship has encouraged Qoriah, 34, to return to Hong Kong 
for a second contract, despite leaving her spouse behind.
Qoriah: Wives working abroad are the ones making money.
Interviewer: Does your husband feel ashamed because you’re making more than him?
Qoriah: No… If my husband were to work abroad, he’d have to pay. But he doesn’t have the 
money to buy a job. So, it’s the wife who’s forced to go overseas.
Limited Alternatives
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In a global migratory order often assumed to be dictated by developed nations, why has 
Taiwan depended on caregivers from Indonesia, rather than turning to alternative policy 
mechanisms or labor exporters willing to accept lower recruitment expenses? Despite the 
passage of the Long-Term Care Services Act in 2017—legislation mandating the integration of 
homecare, community care, and other social services—the expansion of subsidized care facilities 
in Taiwan has not kept pace with demand. The island has, instead, relied on market solutions 
underpinned by low-cost migrant labor. Even with the recent pay raise, MDWs’ base salary falls 
below Taiwan’s minimum wage and averages four times lower than the typical salary scale for 
citizen caregivers. That Taiwan is reluctant to standardize wages and work conditions in 
homecare has to do with the absence of a Domestic Workers’ Bill of Rights and employers’ 
lobbying (interview, SY, 2018). Yang, a senior official at Taiwan’s Labor Ministry, suggests that 
weak regulations and low wages have reinforced a high demand for MDWs: “Because they need 
quality but affordable care, families prefer to hire foreign labor. Also, migrant caregivers reside 
with employers, so they can be told to work at any time … Without long-term care facilities, it’s 
difficult to end employers’ dependence on foreign caregivers.”
Alongside deficits in affordable care, the dearth of countervailing labor sources has 
exacerbated Taiwan’s reliance on Indonesians. Like Singapore (Goh, Wee, and Yeoh 2017), 
Taiwan faces practical constraints in acquiring care workers from other developing countries. 
Though Taiwan had imported MDWs from Mongolia, it failed to gather momentum due to a low 
labor supply (interview, HH, 2018). Other countries, such as Sri Lanka, do not supply labor to 
Taiwan for geopolitical reasons, as stated by Yang: “The Ministry of Manpower has been trying 
to find alternative labor pools. But some countries are unwilling to cooperate with Taiwan due to 
weak diplomatic ties.” In short, a modest place in the destination hierarchy, combined with few 
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options for procuring labor, has aggravated Taiwan’s dependence on Indonesia. Expressing 
Indonesian MDWs’ ascendance, Eko, CEO of a Ponorogo firm specializing in Hong Kong, 
opines, “Indonesian migrants nowadays are spoiled (manja). In the past, migrants strived hard to 
overcome challenges. These days, if employers are too demanding, migrants would ask to return 
home because they’re homesick.”
FACTORY MARKET
Organization of Supply
If Indonesia has reconfigured the stakes of the homecare market, why has it not replicated 
this success in the factory sector? While the state has dedicated administrative resources to 
credentialing MDWs, it has not spearheaded a compulsory training program for MFWs. Lacking 
state support, recruiters have strategized by training, screening, and expropriating migrants, 
though without systematically elevating their origin hierarchy position. The Indonesian 
government’s failure to professionalize MFWs has made it difficult to surmount the industry 
norm of job-buying, in a context where other developing countries have secured a niche through 
state-driven skill training.
No Credentialing and Competing Origin States
Indonesia has not mandated accreditation for occupations beyond domestic service for 
historical and ideological reasons. A late entrant in formal employment, the archipelago has 
seized only a handful of destinations and unskilled occupations. Talim, a former labor attaché to 
the UAE, asserts how the low placement volume of MFWs has generated few incentives for 
investment in an industrial training program: “[The number of] housemaids once deployed to 
Saudi Arabia [was as high as] 15,000 per month. With such a huge quantity, it made sense for 
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entrepreneurs to invest in training centers. [But few] Indonesian migrants are placed in ‘dirty, 
difficult, and dangerous’ sectors, such as factories, which don’t really require training.”
Beyond historical factors, as I have argued elsewhere (Chang 2018), the state has not 
necessitated training for migrant groups other than MDWs, because the latter occupy a unique 
place in Indonesian officials’ imaginary as vulnerable citizens. Yohanes, a BP2MI official, avers 
that “conditions for domestic workers are poor because they are vulnerable worker[s]. In the 
Middle East, Indonesian domestics are treated like slaves. They’re not given a salary, experience 
sexual harassment, and are denied rest.” For her, credentialing is useful for guarding MDWs 
against the vagaries of in-home care work by training women to regulate their professional 
conduct, such that they are “competent, healthy, mentally prepared, linguistically proficient.” 
The ideology of state paternalism is a double-edged sword: while it subjects MDWs to skill 
formation in the name of their security, it renders illegible the market exclusion of MFWs, who 
are assumed to be protected by host states’ labor codes and not in need of improvement 
(interview, KM, 2017).
                                                  (Figure 2 about here)
Indonesia’s differentiated treatment of emigrant labor—interventionist in homecare, 
laissez-faire in factory work—has unintentionally undercut MFWs’ employment prospects. Over 
the past three decades, governments in Vietnam, Thailand, and the Philippines have instated 
various training programs to promote their nationals’ capture of global manufacturing jobs 
(Huong 2010; Sills and Chowthi 2008; Sobieszczyk 2000), so much so that Indonesians have had 
to await the exodus of competitors to garner market access. For example, Lee, a Taiwanese 
manager of a major caregiver agency in Surabaya, has dispatched a growing number of 
Indonesians to Taiwanese factories largely because of Thais’ onward migration to East Asia’s 
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higher-wage destinations. She states, “Our hope is to replace Thai workers, who are migrating to 
South Korea where they can earn a monthly salary of $1,500.” However, Lee acknowledges that 
Indonesians possess little bargaining power in a market still dominated by other players: 
“Taiwanese agencies believe that, ‘Now that Indonesians need a job, as long as there’s a gap 
between supply and demand, you’ll just have to kiss up.’ As we can’t compete … we’ll have to 
give them meat.” 
Deficiencies in credentials have further dampened the prestige of Indonesian MFWs. 
Kao, a specialist in Vietnamese labor, avows that Vietnamese—despite sharing similar 
qualifications and timing of market entry with Indonesians—are paragons of efficiency: 
“Indonesians’ work pace is slower. Factories emphasize speed, as they work on strict deadlines. 
Vietnamese work faster, and they’re smarter. I have a garment factory client that uses piece rates, 
but if you work too slowly, that’s not gonna fly.” Chu further claims that Taiwanese 
manufacturers privilege Vietnamese labor because of cultural proximity: “Vietnamese culture is 
similar to ours. They also eat pork, and many are Buddhists, so they’re easier to manage. But 
[industrialists] think that Indonesia is a high-risk country, where men are combative. That’s 
because we learn from the news that Muslims are extremists.” While conceding Indonesian 
women are model caregivers, Chu uses the western trope of Islamic extremism to essentialize 
difference, viewing Muslim masculinity as incompatible with industrial employment. That 
Indonesian Muslims are simultaneously constructed as superior for care work, and undesirable 
for factory work, underscores how credentialing has improved the desirability of Indonesian 
caregivers, who are trained to prepare pork dishes for employers. Consistent with the two 
brokers’ statements, Pai, an Indonesian labor provider in Kaohsiung, stresses how poor 
credentials have impeded Indonesians’ acquisition of Taiwan’s manufacturing jobs: “We 
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wouldn’t consider placing Indonesian men in factory jobs requiring skills. Rather, we 
recommend them for menial labor, since they don’t have any skills or training to speak of.”
Private Training
The absence of credentialing has led Indonesia’s private sector to narrow what a 
Singaporean investor, Adri, calls MFWs’ “skill gap.” While few recruiters in my sample supply 
MFWs to Taiwan, two are among Indonesia’s largest firms with industrial training programs of 
varying magnitude. With an ambitious plan to break into the Japanese and Taiwanese markets, 
Hsieh, a Taiwanese-born agent, operates thirteen recruitment locations in Indonesia and a 
reception office in Taoyuan, a Taiwanese manufacturing hub. In July 2017, I visited Hsieh’s 
three-story boarding school in Jakarta designed to accommodate 1,000 students. I observed 
classes teeming with men in uniforms learning Japanese, using a Computer Numerical Control 
machine in a spacious warehouse, and driving a tractor along the basketball court. Hsieh models 
his managerial techniques after his training center for MDWs, requiring men to undergo two 
months of residential training in Japanese and Mandarin, fitness, obedience, and factory 
machinery usage. Having invested $3,634,710 in building state-of-the-art facilities, Hsieh 
describes how his training is innovative in Indonesia’s migration industry:
Indonesian factory migrants weren’t trained in the past. That’s why we need to constantly 
educate them. [We tell them,] “If you’re unwilling to modify your behavior, we’ll expel you 
after three warnings” We don’t want our clients to think, “Why did you send us poorly 
behaved workers?” We take great care in evaluating workers’ manners, work attitude, 
health, and stamina, since they’re menial, not office, employees.
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Whereas Hsieh runs a full-fledged curriculum, Koan inculcates recruits’ occupational skills only 
when requested by employers, as it supplies predominantly unskilled operators to chemical, 
metal, and other labor-intensive industries. Koan’s agency contains gender-segregated boarding 
facilities for MDWs and MFWs on the same plot of land. Most MFWs are taught basic 
vocabulary, with some undergoing a mere five days of Mandarin learning before departure. As 
Koan suggests, in Taiwanese, “Languages and skills aren’t critical. What’s more important is 
that factory migrants aren’t too smart (khiau), are obedient, work slowly but attentively.” The 
haphazard nature of training is evident during my observation one day, when a 31-year-old man, 
who had resided at the center for a month, stuttered with “I am, am, am, am,” in response to an 
instructor’s command to translate the sentence, “My dormitory is in the factory.” 
Screening 
Whereas the Indonesian government’s accreditation program assists employers in vetting 
MDWs, Indonesian brokers develop their credibility as factory suppliers by weeding out unruly 
or incompetent labor on their own. Koan scrutinizes applicants for their so-called “character,” 
(karakter) devising elaborate metrics to appraise their attitude, agility, strength, intelligence, and 
work ethic, which are tabulated into numeric scores with descriptions affixed to resumes. A 
sample resume reads, “The worker is strong, has dark skin, works hard, is moderately intelligent, 
is not picky about jobs.” During a pre-recruitment session with 80 candidates in Ponorogo, 
staring into their eyes and speaking in a growling voice, Koan ordered men to hold a 30-kg 
sandbag on one shoulder while squatting down and standing up in succession. Those failing the 
physical test were eliminated, with only 30 qualifying for recruitment as unskilled laborers. Koan 
further prepared prospective recruits for harsh labor conditions with the following 
announcement, “You’ll do work that Taiwanese people don’t want. [It involves] hard work in a 
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hot, uncomfortable, or unpleasant environment. These are the kinds of jobs that Indonesians are 
assigned to. Remember: you don’t get to choose. If you make mistakes thrice, you’ll be 
deported.”
Candidates for semi-skilled jobs undertake an additional round of on-site selection by 
foreign headhunters. Tu, a Taiwanese broker, flew into Jakarta on March 4, 2016 to handpick 
Koan’s trainees as a trial run for recruiting 400 MFWs for a Taiwanese electronics factory 
erstwhile staffed by Filipinos. Tu had recently visited the Philippines, where he claimed four of 
the country’s largest agencies had organized a factory job fair consisting of 1,000 applicants. On 
Tu’s selection day in Indonesia, men in white dress shirts and black trousers performed a timed 
sequence of exercises. Carrying a 40-kg sandbag on one shoulder, they ran four 12-meter laps, 
accompanied by horizontal bar hangs, pushups, and sit-ups. Three men tripped during their 
sprint, but quickly sprang up to complete the sequence. Candidates also took an “IQ test” 
evaluating their logical reasoning. In the final stage, Tu interviewed shortlisted candidates, 
during which he touched their palms to gauge hand sweat and ordered them to lift their shirts for 
inspection. Tu rejected a candidate with a scar on his torso, after learning he had suffered a work 
injury in Malaysia. To assess their likelihood of absconding, Tu interrogated applicants on their 
relationship status, motives for working abroad, and whether they had kith and kin in Taiwan. 
Among a handful of female factory candidates, a former MDW was turned down on the grounds 
of being a troublemaker, after admitting she had previously lodged a complaint to Taiwan’s 
Labor Bureau. 
As the cases above illustrate, Indonesian brokers have enacted selection mechanisms of 
uneven quality to promote factory labor in lieu of state sponsorship. Although such schemes 
facilitate individual firms’ market entry, they lack the structural weight of a government 
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credentialing program capable of raising Indonesians’ international profile and venturing into 
Taiwan’s factory labor market.
Inability to Regulate Overcharging
Indonesia’s feeble status in the origin hierarchy has granted Taiwanese agents the 
authority to demand kickbacks for easing Indonesians’ penetration into the factory market. 
Under this model of worker payout, sending brokers vie for jobs by transferring economic capital 
from migrants to destination agents. Susanna, a Chinese-Indonesian manager of a Jakarta 
agency, notes that recruiters craving a market share compete by extorting money from migrants: 
“Agents here are bidding for job orders from Taiwan, and the fees are getting ridiculously high. 
The most daring ones are demanding loads of money from workers.” 
Whereas the Indonesian government has achieved a wage hike for MDWs in Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, and Singapore, lacking a monopsony in the factory market, it has been unable to 
combat the prevalence of job-buying, though it imposed a moratorium on factory placement to 
Taiwan in 2017. Krisna, a BP2MI official, states that migrants rarely report brokerage 
malpractices because “they’re afraid that they can’t go abroad. But once they arrive overseas, 
they’ll tell us that they paid by cash.” Krisna explains the state’s intervention in a narrative of 
emigrant welfare: 
If the industry were healthy, the government wouldn’t need to interfere because market 
prices are determined by supply and demand. But because industry competition isn’t 
healthy, workers’ interests are harmed. Migrant workers complain to us, “Why does the 
government let the market go untrammeled, and why are we being burdened with fees 
that are even higher than those approved by the Taiwanese and Indonesian 
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governments?” Of the 500 or 490 recruitment agencies in Indonesia, fewer than 20% 
aren’t overcharging migrants.      
The Taiwanese officials interviewed for this study insist that Taiwan revokes the licenses of 
agencies known to overcharge workers. However, though Indonesian bureaucrats place the 
blame on destination brokers, Taiwanese regulators absolve themselves by claiming that 
brokerage fees are extracted by recruiters outside their jurisdiction, as expressed by Lan, a New 
Taipei bureaucrat, “We can’t oversee how much money agents are demanding from workers in 
their home countries. Buying a job is an issue involving the [sending] government.” In summary, 
without instituting a comprehensive training program to match those of other labor exporters, 
Indonesia has encountered considerable difficulties in generating demand for MFWs and 
outlawing commissions to foreign brokers.
Organization of Demand
Whereas their leverage in homecare is hamstrung by the Indonesian state, Taiwanese 
brokers have exploited their control over East Asia’s largest quantity of manufacturing vacancies 
to expropriate MFWs through an assortment of brokerage fees, wage cuts, and substandard 
employment.
Labor Market Segmentation
Filipinos and Thais dominate semi-skilled jobs in Taiwan’s high-tech and large-scale 
factories thanks to their college education, international reputation, or English proficiency. 
Conversely, Taiwanese brokers exploit the weak credentials of Vietnamese and Indonesian 
workers to place them in the island’s technologically backward—typically family-run—
manufacturing sectors. Brokers also stratify job pricing depending on sending states’ regulatory 
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capacities, with Vietnamese paying the highest fees of $4,000 to $6,000, followed by 
Indonesians at $2,000 to $3,000, and Thais and Filipinos at $1,000. The latter three nationalities 
pay less because their governments, aiming to protect emigrant welfare, set lower debt ceilings 
than Vietnam, which authorizes Vietnamese brokers to charge up to $4,000 for factory 
placement. 
While origin states’ regulations on debt bondage and pre-departure training may 
moderate migrants’ brokerage fees, as is the case for Filipinos in high tech, Taiwanese agents 
generally assign migrants to jobs based on the level of commission. Taking advantage of weaker 
oversight in Vietnam, agents sell most of Taiwan’s unskilled jobs to the highest bidders, as 
revealed in Kao’s statement: “From the standpoint of Taiwanese agents, we’d definitely want 
higher brokerage commissions and recommend Vietnamese for employers.” In fact, Nguyen, an 
NGO worker of Vietnamese heritage, asserts that Taiwanese brokers maneuver loopholes by 
having Vietnamese collaborators collect fees under the table: “Taiwanese brokers deduct money 
in the name of their Vietnamese counterparts. It’s a smokescreen for extracting money from 
workers.” 
Job Pricing, Wage Cuts, and Substandard Employment
Taiwanese brokers further craft job pricing based on criteria other than nationality. 
Factories with decent work conditions and guaranteed overtime tend to garner higher brokerage 
fees, as they presumably allow migrants to pay off debt more quickly and enjoy a better quality 
of life. Yet, industrialists often pay below Taiwan’s legal overtime rate. At Koan’s firm, several 
candidates signed letters consenting to receive $3.7 per hour in overtime, a 25% cost saving for 
employers. Brokers and bosses also connive to deploy overtime as a disciplinary technique by 
removing this “privilege” to punish recalcitrant migrants, or by coercing migrants to meet 
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production targets. Consider the example of Rohim, who worked in a Taiwanese factory 
producing cardboard boxes for export. Rohim woke up at 7:30 a.m., but could not go to bed until 
2 a.m. the next day, as his third shift ended at midnight. Rohim recalls teasing Indonesian 
neophytes for being “lazy,” who, despite initially requesting overtime, experienced exhaustion 
after merely four months of employment. Industrialists, moreover, sometimes resort to 
lengthening the workday by depriving MFWs of legally mandated rest. For example, Anto, a 
trainee, inked an agreement with a Taiwanese broker, consenting to a 12-14 hours workday and 
“running a machine while eating lunch” in place of a lunch break as required by law. 
Employers engage in additional cost-saving measures with the assistance of brokers. As a 
concession from the Taiwanese government (Tierney 2007), factory owners habitually deduct 
$83 to $150 a month for dormitory utilities and room and board, costs that are waived for 
MDWs. In addition, industrial migrants often face arbitrary, illegal fines for minor infractions, 
such as public drunkenness and dormitory curfew violations. MFWs are further compelled to pay 
for their own recruitment. Whereas Taiwanese employers subsidize the enlistment of MDWs, 
Hau suggests that sponsors are authorized to extract a commission from MFWs: “We can pass on 
sponsor fees to industrial workers, [telling sponsors], ‘You can take a cut of [$280-350] from 
workers.’” Consequently, though they are entitled to the minimum wage and worksite protection 
as formal employees in Taiwan, the average take-home salary for MFWs, excluding brokerage 
fees and overtime, is nearly equivalent to MDWs’ base salary. 
High brokerage fees combined with systematic wage theft have meant that MFWs are 
unable to accumulate savings until the final years of their contracts, with many forced to 
mortgage property to muster funds to work abroad. Alfiah, 25, describes how he put together his 
$2,810 down payment, and how long it would take him to break even: “I sold a cow and a 
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motorcycle. But that wasn’t even enough to cover the down payment. If we were to work in 
Taiwan, it’d take a year to pay off brokerage costs. It’s only in the second year that we get to 
have money for ourselves, and it’s only in the third year that we get to start a small business.”
Finally, agents render migrant bodies disposable by reserving Taiwan’s accident-prone 
jobs for Indonesians. At Koan’s firm, two men’s hands were burnt when smelting iron in a 
Taiwanese foundry. The pair returned to Indonesia within a week of work commencement, as the 
employer did not shoulder their healthcare expenses. Yanto, a former worker at a Taiwanese 
battery manufacturer, relates a similar incidence of precarity: “The factory used toxic chemicals, 
so much so that my stomach bled, and my feet couldn’t move! Me and my Indonesian co-
workers had to be hospitalized.” The dearth of human and cultural capital has rendered 
Indonesian MFWs multiply subjugated, compelled to pay high brokerage fees and take Taiwan’s 
“dangerous, dirty, and demeaning” jobs.
CONCLUSION
In a global migratory system that transcends national boundaries, guest workers 
increasingly “vote with their feet” by eschewing destinations with perilous work conditions for 
those with higher wages, stronger labor safeguards, even prospects for permanent settlement 
(Paul 2017; Rainwater and Williams 2019). Origin states may further negotiate advantageous 
terms of exchange, besides promoting their citizens’ admission into prestigious international 
professions (Guevarra 2009; Ortiga 2014). A country’s capacity to exercise its political clout, 
however, depends on its structural location amid competing nations. Bringing Bourdieusian 
migration research in conversation with gendered migration studies, this article advances a 
theory of multilateral labor markets as institutional arenas where actors across multiple countries 
contest to normalize the rules of exchange in gendered occupations. This multistate rivalry has 
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the effect of reinforcing status distinctions among countries, permitting brokers to allot 
employment and labor based on one’s configurations of capital linked to nationality. 
Consequently, employers and migrants at the bottom strata of destination and origin hierarchies 
encounter fewer prospects for inclusion into the global labor market. 
By comparing the migratory procedures for Indonesian domestic and factory workers, 
this study further complicates the premise that demand unidirectionally shapes supply, or that 
labor is interchangeable and abundant for foreign capital to procure at will. Instead, states and 
brokers forge homecare and factory employment as segmented markets with contrasting 
regulatory logics, even as they produce and consume gendered laboring bodies. With women’s 
commodified reproductive labor (Lan 2006; Parreñas 2001) progressively overtaking men’s 
industrial labor in the maintenance of global capitalism, Indonesia has strategically leveraged its 
well-developed migration infrastructure (Chang 2018; Lindquist, Xiang, and Yeoh 2012) and 
surplus labor to manufacture ideal care workers through public-private partnership in labor 
management. I have argued that the market for homecare labor is governed under the rubric of 
“selling a resume,” or a system of employer sponsorship, in which bosses in several destination 
states jostle for migrant women’s labor-power by rewarding agent chains in Indonesia. As a 
result of interstate competition and the sending state’s intervention, host societies find 
themselves in a double bind: they withstand longer recruitment queues, along with galloping 
resume fees and wages. 
By contrast, the case of MFWs reveals that, when destination states erect barriers to 
reserve formal employment for citizens, source societies whose emigrants lack the requisite 
credentials encounter severe constraints for eradicating predatory brokerage practices. The 
factory market is regulated by a form of direct payment called “buying a job,” whereby MFWs 
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vie for jobs by transmitting economic capital to destination brokers. Amid host societies’ quota 
control and variations in sending state regulations, the Indonesian government’s attempt at 
curbing debt bondage, without enhancing MFWs’ qualifications, has permitted rival nations to 
take the “high road” of competition by offering skills, or the “low road” by providing bribes. The 
absence of an industrial credentialing program has further propelled recruiters to subject 
Indonesian MFWs to innumerable conditioning to win the confidence of foreign capital. 
This study attends to recent calls by students of transnationalism (Basch, Schiller, and 
Blanc 1994) to go beyond the nation-state as a unit of analysis, directing our attention towards 
the multifaceted resource struggles between and among receiving and sending states in a 
supranational migratory order. A multilateral approach to international migration alerts us to the 
gendered, classed, and racialized mechanisms by which state and commercial actors govern 
territorial borders, generating unequal valuations of migrants’ worth in a globalizing labor 
market.
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Indonesia Taiwan & 
Singapore
Government:
  National 12 11 1
  Provincial 1 1
  Regency or Municipal 5 2 3
Employment Agencies and Training Centers:
  Management 26 22 4
  Other Personnel 24 19 5
Credentialing Institutes:
  Assessors 6 6
Nongovernmental Organizations 2 2
Migrants:
  Domestic Workers 5 5
  Factory Workers 5 5
Total 86 71 15
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